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On April 23, 1998, an employee missed work at the Subway Sandwich
Shop in South Pasadena, outside of Tampa Bay, Florida. Ann Marie
Sherman volunteered to work the shift and took a lunch order from a man
named Robert Pasquince. Before she could fill the order, Pasquince pulled
out a gun and demanded money. He made Sherman and her co-worker lie
face-down on the floor as he tried, unsuccessfully, to open the cash register.
The man grew frustrated and Sherman cried out, "Please don't kill me!"
Pasquince shot Ann Marie Sherman in the heart and she died moments
later. She was twenty-four years old, the eldest of Paula and Duane
Sherman's seven children. Robert Pasquince escaped with $277 in cash
from the Subway Sandwich Shop, which had no working surveillance
camera or silent alarm button.1
Throughout the United States, sixteen people, on average, die while
doing their job each day. 2 While on-the-job deaths from motor vehicle
accidents, machine-related injuries, falls and electrocutions have steadily
declined for almost two decades, murder has been the only category of
workplace fatalities that has remained constant.3 Perhaps it should be no
surprise, for while safety technology becomes more effective and safety
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I. See Anita Kumar, Family of Murdered Worker Sues Subway, ST. PETERSBURG
TMEs, Dec. 29, 1999, at 3B.
2. See Linda Micco, Homicide Now Second-Ranked Cause of Deaths in Workplace,
HR NEWS, June 1998, at 12 [hereinafter Homicide Now].
3. See id.
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regulations become more strict, human nature itself never changes.
Homicide has been ominously climbing the rankings of workplace
deaths and is now the second leading cause, accounting for 14% of all such
fatalities between 1980 and 1994, according to recent statistics published
by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH"), a
division of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC").
4
From 1990 through 1994, homicide was the leading cause of on-the-job
deaths in California, the District of Columbia, Michigan, and New York.5
Across the nation, homicide is now the leading cause of death for women
in the workplace. 6 Occupational homicide is the fastest-growing form of
murder in the United States. The rate has more than doubled in the past
ten years.' Currently, an average of twenty people a week are murdered
while on the job.9
On the surface, the most dangerous jobs would appear to be in law
enforcement. Indeed, 155 officers were killed in 1998 alone,' ° and the on-
duty death rate is more than three times the national average." However,
those statistics include murders as well as accidental deaths resulting from
line-of-duty actions taken while pursuing a suspect or rescuing a victim.' 2
In actuality, retail employees are the victims of more on-the-job
murders than employees in any other occupation. With so many
workplace murders occurring in retail, it may be no surprise that 75% of
14
workplace murders occur during robberies, compared to nine percent of
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Linda Micco, OSHA Issues Recommendations for Improving Night Retail
Safety, HR NEws, June 1998, at 13 [hereinafter OSHA Issues].
7. See William Flannery, A Million Assaults Occur on the Job, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 1999, at E2.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Gary Fields, In 1998, 155 Law Enforcement Officers were Killed in Line of
Duty, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 1998, at 3A.
11. See id.
12. See id. In 1998, sixty-three officers were shot to death, forty-four were killed in
automobile accidents, one was beaten to death, one was killed in a bomb-related incident,
and the remaining forty-six were either drowned, struck by vehicles, or killed in plane
crashes. The highest rates of purely accidental workplace death are found amongst miners,
farmers, foresters, and fisherman. See Jeanette Steele, Tool Belt Jobs Can Be Risky, Experts
Say, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), Dec. 9, 1998, at A10.
13. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, Current Intelligence Bulletin 57, Violence in the Workplace: Homicide in
the Workplace (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violhomi.html>
[hereinafter Homicide in the Workplace].
14. See ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONVENIENCE STORES
RESOURCE BOOK: CONVENIENCE STORE SECURITY AT THE MILLENIUM 21 (1998). This report
may be obtained online at <http:llwww.cstorecentral.com./register/resourcelresourcel
security2000.pdf> or by contacting NACS at (703)684-3600. See also Flannery, supra note
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murders being robbery-related in the general population."
On November 9, 1998, Ai Trinh asked his sister-in-law, Tung Tran, to
watch his Indiana Foodmart store while he went to the bank during lunch.
When Trinh returned shortly after noon that day, he found Tran dead, shot
once in the head. Tran, a mother of a 15-year-old girl, was killed for $500
in cash taken from the store's register.
16
Donna-Jean Roberts, a divorced mother of two young girls, worked
for one month as a store clerk in West Long Branch, New Jersey. While
working alone early one afternoon, a man entered the store and forced her,
at knifepoint, to open the store safe. Once the safe was open, the robber
grabbed Roberts by the hair, yanked her head back, and stabbed her
multiple times in the throat. Her body, lying in a pool of blood, was
discovered by a customer less than an hour later. The videotape from the
store's one surveillance camera was missing, and detectives believe that the
robber-turned-killer removed the tape before leaving with an undetermined
amount of cash.
7
In the early morning hours of July 13, 1998, two customers found
Robert Strawn's body. He had been shot in the chest sometime the day
before at the Exxon station where he worked, off Interstate 30 near Little
Rock, Arkansas. Strawn's car and gun were stolen, along with money from
the cash register. Police had answered nine robbery/assault calls at the
Exxon station since January of that year. 1
7; United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries, 1997 (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:/www.bls.gov/special.requests/
ocwc/oshwc/cfoi/cfnr0004.txt> [hereinafter CFOI 1997].
15. See ERICKSON, supra note 14; see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Current Intelligence Bulletin 57,
Violence in the Workplace: Purpose and Scope (visited Mar. 23, 2000)
<http:llwww.cdc.gov/nioshlviolpurp.html> [hereinafter Purpose and Scope]. It is worth
noting that, though most workplace murders occur during robberies, approximately 250
workers are killed each year for non-criminal, personal, or unknown reasons. See Flannery,
supra note 7. For examples of on-the-job homicides during which no underlying crime,
such as robbery, occurred, see Kay Michael, Scales Gets Life Term for Dunbar Slaying, THE
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 1999, at A10 (describing the shooting death of Mark
Ballengee, a disabled veteran who worked nights in a South Carolina convenience store to
help support his two children, whose killer took no money from the register, though it
contained over $900); see also Ronald J. Hansen & Susan Ferrechio, Two Guns Used in
Starbucks Slayings, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at Al (describing the gruesome, and
eventually high-profile, shooting deaths of three Starbucks employees in the Georgetown
area of Washington, D.C., where no money or valuables were taken from the store); Jim
Keary and Ronald J. Hansen, Cops Eye Five Suspects One Year After Starbucks Killings,
WASH. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at Al.
16. See Ed Godfrey, Man Charged in Slaying at Convenience Store, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 18, 1998, at 4.
17. See Terri Somers, Tracking a Suspect: Robbery Likely Led to Slaying of Store
Clerk, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, NJ), Oct. 31, 1998, at Al.
18. See Erin Shulte, Clerk's Slaying in Robbery Puts Police, Businesses on High Alert,
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The stories of Tung Tran, Donna-Jean Roberts, and Robert Strawn
highlight the statistic around which this Comment revolves: roughly half of
the workplace homicides in this nation take place in retail establishments
such as fast-food restaurants, convenience stores, liquor stores, and gas
stations.19
The issue of retail employee safety has been simmering since 1995,
when then-Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich prompted the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA") to prepare guidelines
addressing workplace violence in the retail industry.2 ° Since then,
controversy has swirled around the guidelines and the role of OSHA.
21
After a number of false starts and failed attempts, OSHA finally
issued non-binding recommendations related to workplace violence
prevention on April 28, 1998. 22 However, the story is far from over. On
the contrary, the matter is only heating up as reactions are voiced from all
comers of the industry: victim's groups, national business associations, and
other government agencies.23 While opinions range from those who wish
OSHA had done more to those who believe OSHA should never have been
involved at all, the one commonality is that not a single player in this saga
regards the issue as insignificant. Indeed, with three workers murdered
each day, delay becomes a critical factor for employers, employees, and
anyone who has ever stopped off on the way home from work for a few
needed groceries.
This Comment will provide an overview of the guidelines debate and
shed light on some of the more subtle, sometimes counterintuitive,
arguments that shape the policies at issue. Section I traces the modem
history of occupational homicide, including the surveys performed, the
statistics gleaned, and the trends emerging therein. Section II recounts the
THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 14, 1998, at Al; see also Jose Patino Girona,
Pair Now Charged in Clerk's Death, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 9, 1999, at 7 (describing a robbery
during which two teenagers forced a store clerk to lie face down, at gunpoint, while they
removed $63 from the register, only to be charged with first-degree murder when the clerk,
56, died of a heart attack shortly after the robbery).
19. See Flannery, supra note 7.
20. See Ralph Vartabedian, Campaign Cash Makes Stores Safe for Killers,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 28, 1997, at Fl.
21. See, e.g., Stephen Barlas, NACS, PMAA Miss on OSHA Guidelines, NAT'L
PETROLEUM NEws, Nov. 1996, at 24; Convenience Store Group Worries About
Recommendations, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY NEWSL., Mar. 16, 1998 [hereinafter
Convenience Store Group Worries]; Judy L. Thomas & Monica L. Burroughs, Can
Guidelines Save Lives?, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 29, 1998, at Cl;
Ralph Vartabedian, OSHA's Plan Targets Safety of Store Clerks, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr.
28, 1998, at Al [hereinafter OSHA's Plan].
22. See Vartabedian, supra note 20; OSHA's Plan, supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., OSHA Issues, supra note 6; Vicki Vaughan, Violence Targeted by OSHA,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 29, 1998, at El.
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OSHA recommendations controversy, beginning with the years of non-
involvement, continuing through incidents of suspicious political
maneuvering, postponements, and changes in OSHA leadership, and
culminating in the contentious publication, on Worker Memorial Day, of
the 1998 guidelines. Section III covers the range of reactions to the
guidelines and articulates, in detail, the most severe areas of disagreement.
In particular, Section III addresses the divisive issue of multiple clerks
during night shifts - whether the presence of a second clerk acts as a
deterrent or simply places another person in harm's way. Section IV offers
an analysis of the current situation, specifically, why OSHA involvement is
appropriate in the first place and why the controversial recommendations,
though not binding, should be heeded.
I. THE MODERN HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL HOMICIDE
The first wide-scale survey of work-related injuries took place in
1912.24 That year, the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS"), a division of the
Department of Labor, conducted a nationwide study of industrial accidents
in the steel and iron industries.2' Though several studies of individual
industries followed, disparate methods of recordkeeping prevented the
collection of general nationwide work injury data until the late 1930s.
26
At that time, the BLS launched an annual nationwide survey that
focused on "work injuries that resulted in death, permanent impairment, or
temporary disability."27 Though these surveys continued uninterrupted for
almost three decades, several limitations in the reporting of the data
hindered their accuracy. The most significant limitation was that
employers were not required by law to keep work-injury data28 Thus, the
annual calculations were based solely on information provided by
employers who volunteered both to maintain and contribute such records.29
In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("the Act") in order "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources."30 The Act directed the Secretary of Labor to issue
regulations requiring, for the first time, every employer in the nation to
"maintain accurate records of, and to make periodic reports on, work-
24. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, History of BLS
Safety and Health Statistical Programs (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:llwww.bls.gov/
oshhist.htm> [hereinafter History of BLS].
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1999).
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related deaths, injuries and illnesses, '31 and to make available those records
to the federal government.32
The Secretary of Labor was also directed for the first time to "compile
accurate statistics on work injuries and illnesses, 33 and to submit an annual
report, to the President and Congress, with evaluations and analyses of
work-related safety programs and incidents across the nation.34 The
Occupational Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA") was created to
enforce the provisions of the Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant
to the Act.35  The Secretary of Labor delegated to the BLS the
36responsibility of gathering the relevant statistics.
For many years, however, the federal government focused its efforts
on nonfatal work-related injuries, as those incidents numbered close to one
million each year.37 Most of the individual academic studies that focused
on worker fatalities covered only a specific occupation or geographic
region.31 The only major comprehensive survey of work-related deaths was
the National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities ("NTOF") Surveillance
System, operated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health. Although the NTOF incorporated data from all fifty states and the
District of Columbia, the data retrieved was based solely on death
certificates on which the certifier noted a positive response to the "injury at
work" question.39
Notwithstanding the NTOF's limitations, the results gathered were
significant. From 1980 to 1992, 9,937 people were murdered while
working - an average of 764 per year.40 In 1980 and 1981, the two worst
years during this period, the occupational homicide rate was almost one in
31. Id. at § 657(c)(2).
32. See id. at § 657(c)(1).
33. Id. at § 673(a).
34. See id. at § 675 (1999).
35. See History of BLS, supra note 24.
36. See id.
37. See generally Dino Drudi, A Century-Long Quest for Meaningful and Accurate
Occupational Injury and Illness &tatistics (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.bls.gov/
special.requests/ocwc/oshwc/osarOOO2.txt>.
38. See, e.g., Harold Davis et al., Fatal Occupational Injuries of Women, Texas 1975-
1984, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1524 (1987); Harold Davis, Workplace Homicides of Texas
Males, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1290 (1987); Craig D. Uchida et al., Danger to Police
During Domestic Encounters: Assaults on Baltimore County Police, 2 CRIM. JUST. POLICE
REP. 357 (1987); Franklin E. Zimmering & James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban
Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15 J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1986).
39. See Homicide in the Workplace, supra note 13, at NIOSH Data; see also Castillo &
Jenkins, Industries and Occupations at High-Risk for Work-Related Homicide, 36 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 125 (1994) (discussing the NTOF system and limitations on the use of
death certificates in workplace homicide studies).
40. See Homicide in the Workplace, supra note 13, at Table 1.
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100,000 workers. 41 Over the thirteen-year period studied, homicide ranked
as the leading cause of work-related death in Alabama, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Michigan, New York, and South Carolina.42
The retail trade, specifically, accounted for more murders during this
period than any other industry, incurring more than double the number of
murders in services, the next highest industry.43 Approximately 38 percent
of all workplace homicides - greater than 36% of all male worker
homicides and almost 46% of all female worker homicides - took place
within the retail trade during this period.45
Though firearms were used in over 76% of these homicides,46 a
percentage somewhat higher than that found in the general population,47 the
number of firearm-related homicides generally decreased.48  The total
number of workplace homicides also decreased steadily throughout the
1980s. 49 By 1989, the rate had dropped to 0.59 deaths in 100,000 workers,
almost a 40 percent decrease since 1980.50
However, in the early 1990s, the counts of work-related murders
began to increase again. 1 In the period from 1990 to 1992, the number of
homicides surpassed those of machine-related accidents and approached
the number of automobile accidents, the leading cause of workplace
52death. Also, occupational homicides involving firearms increased
significantly beginning in 1990.51 In 1991, 84 percent of all workplace
homicides involved firearms, as compared to 74 percent in 1980.
54
The shifts in statistics between the 1980s and the early 1990s may
reflect a number of changing factors. Increased labeling of incidents as
"work-related" may have contributed to higher numbers, as well as
increased levels of crime in certain settings.55 The changes may also be
attributed to alterations in the distribution of personnel and safety
resources. 56 A final factor may have been increased recognition or
41. See id.
42. See id. at Geographic Distribution.
43. See id. at Table 7.
44. See id. at Table 2.
45. See id. at Table 7.
46. See id. at Table 6.
47. See id. at Discussion.
48. See id. at Figure 2.
49. See id. at NIOSH Data.
50. See id. at Table 1.
51. See id. at NIOSH Data.
52. See id. at Figure 1.
53. See id. at Figure 2.
54. See id. at Method of Homicide.
55. See id. at Discussion.
56. See id.
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awareness of occupational homicide in general. 7 Indeed, in 1992 the
federal government, possibly in reaction to this heightened awareness,
created its first official survey devoted solely to occupational fatalities.
5 s
That year, the BLS implemented the Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries ("CFOI"), a federal-state cooperative program operating in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia that concentrated exclusively on work-
related incidents resulting in employee death. 9 The CFOI obtains data by
cross-referencing several sources of information, including death
certificates, workers' compensation records, reports to federal and state
regulatory agencies, medical examiner reports, police reports, news stories,
and questionnaires to employers and employees.60 In total, approximately
thirty data elements are collected, coded, and tabulated for each fatal
incident.61 As a result of its comprehensiveness and accuracy, the CFOI
has since been adopted by the National Safety Council as the authoritative
62count of work-related deaths in the nation.
The CFOI defines occupational homicides as any homicide that occurs
while the victim was engaged in "duties, activities, or tasks" which are
"legal" and "done in exchange for money, goods, services, profit, or
benefit., 63 At the time of the incident, the victim must have been "on the
employer's premises and... there to work; or off the employer's premises
and.., there to work, or the event or exposure was related to the person's
work or status as an employee." 64 The homicidal acts for which individual
statistics are compiled include shooting, stabbing, and "other, including
bombing.
65
On average, nationally, approximately 6,312 people have died on the
job each year since the inception of the CFOI in 1992.66 Almost 20 percent
of these deaths, about 1,246 per year, were the result of homicides, with
almost 66 percent of those homicides, about 817 per year, involving
firearms.67 The concentration of such homicides within the retail industry
57. See id.
58. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:llwww.bls.gov/oshfatl.htm>
[hereinafter CF01].
59. See id.
60. See CFOI 1997, supra note 14, at Technical Notes: Measurement Techniques and
Limitations.
61. See id.
62. See CFOI, supra note 58.
63. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries: Definitions (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:llstats.bls.gov:801
oshcfdef.htm> [hereinafter Definitions].
64. Id.
65. CFO1 1997, supra note 14, at Table 1.
66. See id; CFOI, supra note 58.
67. See CFOI 1997, supra note 14, at Table 1.
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is not only still present, but is more conspicuous than ever.
In a table of CFOI statistics dividing fatal occupational injuries in
1997 by occupation, the highest percentage, by far, belonged to cashiers:
specifically, 92 percent of all work-related deaths among cashiers were the
result of homicides. 8 Incidents in which the killer was a work associate,
friend, boyfriend, or family member only account for 15 percent of those
deaths, indicating that 85 percent of those homicides were committed in the
course of a robbery or other crime, by a perpetrator unknown to the
victim.
69
While the CFOI's expansive data gathering provides more detailed and
more comprehensive information than the NTOF, its general identifications
of high-risk demographic and occupational groups match those of the
NTOF to a notable extent.70 Most relevantly, both surveys identify retail
clerks as not only one of the most at-risk occupational groups, but one of
the few groups in this nation for whom the job is becoming more, instead
of less, dangerous. 7' Although the federal government, especially through
the CFOI, has taken steps to identify this problem, the more critical issues
revolve around the steps taken to solve this problem.
II. THE OSHA RECOMMENDATIONS CONTROVERSY
The controversy surrounding the April 28, 1998 issuance of OSHA's
"Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-
Night Retail Establishments" originated in 1995. That year, prompted by
then-Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, OSHA started preparing what was
known as "Guidelines for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs for
Night Retail Establishments."7 2 OSHA issued a "discussion draft" of these
guidelines on April 5, l9963 and set the comment period to run until June
30 of that year.74
Two days before the close of the comment period, the National
Association of Convenience Stores ("NACS") issued official comments
criticizing several of the guidelines' main points and attacking the scientific
68. See id. at Table 2.
69. See id. at Profiles of 1997 Fatal Work Injuries.
70. See Homicide in the Workplace, supra note 13, at Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.
71. See generally Homicide in the Workplace, supra note 13; CFOI 1997, supra note
14.
72. See Vartabedian, supra note 20.
73. See National Association of Convenience Stores, NACS Official Comments to
OSHA on Workplace Prevention Guidelines (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.
cstorecentral.com/register/resource/resource/workpl.html> [hereinafter Official Comments].
74. See National Association of Convenience Stores, NACS Statement in Response to
Guidelines for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs for Night Retail Establishments
(visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:llwww.cstorecentral.com/register/resourceresourcesecurity
2000osha.html> [hereinafter NACS Statement].
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bases of OSHA's "findings.0 5 The comments attracted attention within the
retail industry,76 in part due to the size of the organization. NACS is a
national trade association that represents over 2,100 retail companies,
operating over 67,000 convenience stores and employing over 700,000
workers across the nation.77
The NACS comments condemned OSHA's conclusions, drawn from
studies on workplace violence conducted by state agencies and independent
researchers. 78 NACS also attacked what it considered to be assumptions, or
presumptions, on the part of OSHA in analyzing the results of the studies.79
Specifically, NACS criticized OSHA's proposed guidelines regarding the
staffing of multiple clerks during late-night shifts, the use of bullet-resistant
barriers, the use of closed-circuit televisions, the implementation of safety
recommendations made by employees, and the keeping of safety records
and injury reports.80
Other industry organizations reacted harshly to the proposed
guidelines as well; in fact, the majority of the comments received by OSHA
were negative." Perhaps in response, OSHA extended the comment period
until September 30, 1996.82 A few days after that deadline, OSHA received
a letter signed by 108 members of Congress, objecting to the proposed
guidelines.8 3 The members of Congress hailed from both major parties, and
their letter worked to "completely slow down the agency's issuance of
guidelines," according to Joe Deer, a former OSHA administrator. 4
The letter was well circulated in Congress, in part through the efforts
of the National Restaurant Association, a major political contributor." In
fact, political contributions may have played a large role in the signing of
the letter - a role larger than that acknowledged by those who signed,
especially considering the fact that the letter was sent only five weeks
75. See Official Comments, supra note 73; NACS Statement, supra note 74; National
Association of Convenience Stores, OSHA Lacks Scientific Support for its Proposed
"Guidelines For Workplace Violence Prevention Programs for Night Retail Establishments"
(visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:llwww.cstorecentral.com/register/resource/resource/
oshaviol.htm> [hereinafter OSHA Lacks].
76. See, e.g., Barlas, supra note 21; Kimberly Lowe, Improving Safety in C-Stores,
NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Dec. 1996, at 64.
77. See Official Comments, supra note 73.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Barlas, supra note 21.
82. See id.
83. See Vartabedian, supra note 20; see also OSHA's Plan, supra note 21; Vaughan,
supra note 23.
84. Vartabedian, supra note 20.
85. See id.
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before the November 5, 1996 Congressional elections.86
In mid-October, one week after receiving the Congressional letter,
OSHA again reset the end of the comment period, designating the end of
that month as the final deadline.87 At the same time, OSHA agreed to hold
a stakeholders'88 meeting to obtain industry input, but refused to publish the
guidelines in the Federal Register. 9
At the stakeholders' meeting, held on November 4, 1996,
approximately twenty different speakers presented their arguments against
the OSHA guidelines. 90 The three main objections were: 1) that OSHA
was employing a "one-size-fits-all" approach in assessing the security
needs for the night retail industry; 2) that the research cited by OSHA
lacked scientific support, and in fact ignored contrary results obtained in
studies conducted by NIOSH; and 3) that the guidelines, though not
binding, would be treated as standards in litigation concerning employer
liability.9'
Perhaps not surprisingly, OSHA once again extended the comment
deadline, this time until December 4, 1996.92 However, by this point, the
political and industry opposition had all but "killed the effort."93  The
guidelines were "put on hold" until the waning weeks of 1997, when
Charles Jeffress was appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, the official title for the head of OSHA. 94
Jeffress, upon taking up the reins of OSHA, made sure the guidelines were
"put back on track."95 Not much time passed, however, before opposition
once again resurfaced.
In January of 1998, seven Senators, representing both parties, sent a
letter to Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman, requesting that OSHA advocate
86. See id. The primary author of the letter, Rep. Cass Ballenger (R-N.C.), was the
Chairman of the House of Representatives subcommittee charged with OSHA oversight. In
1995 and 1996, Ballenger received more than $18,000 in contributions from the NACS, the
National Restaurant Association, and other retail groups. Rep. John E. Ensign (R-Nev.) and
Rep. James M. Talent (R-Mo.), both signers, were recipients of $5,000 and $8,000
donations, respectively, courtesy of the NACS. In addition, Jennifer Dunn (R-Wash.)
signed the letter only two days after receiving a $2,000 NACS contribution.
87. See Barlas, supra note 21.
88. OSHA's "stakeholders" include "the business community, labor, other Federal
agencies, the Congress, and the occupational safety and health community." United States
Department of Labor, Occupation Safety and Health Administration, OSHA Strategic Plan,
Section 6: Consultation with Stakeholders (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http:llwww.osha.gov:801
oshinfo/strategic/pg3.html>.
89. See Barlas, supra note 21.
90. See Lowe, supra note 76.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. OSHA's Plan, supra note 21.
94. Vaughan, supra note 23.
95. OSHA's Plan, supra note 21.
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only those safety measures that "have been proven scientifically
effective. 9 6 The letter also urged OSHA to "refrain from promulgation of
guidelines" until the publication of results from certain NIOSH studies.97
OSHA did not comply. Instead, on February 9, 1998, OSHA issued a draft
version to industry personnel that was entitled "recommendations," rather
than "guidelines."98
OSHA scheduled a stakeholders' gathering for February 27, 1998,
which it described as a "working meeting."99  However, OSHA also
announced that the latest draft of the recommendations would not be
distributed until the day of the meeting.1°° NACS and the American
Petroleum Institute ("API") requested, on February 18, 1998, that the
revised draft be made available either through a confidentiality agreement
or through review in OSHA offices, with no copies leaving the premises.' °
The request was never answered, 10 2 and the situation worsened when
NACS officials complained that a reporter contacted them on February 26,
1998, asking for comments on a revised copy of the recommendations that
the reporter had received on February 25, 1998, two full days prior to the
scheduled meeting.)°
The meeting itself did not please most of the attendees.1 OSHA
showed a video that NACS, in a statement released March 4, 1998,
described as "extraordinary in the sense that a federal agency of the United
States government could even produce a video so biased."10 5 According to
NACS, the video "sensationalize[d]" retail violence,' 6 but was only a
precursor to OSHA's skewed presentation of its scientific evidence. The
NACS statement asserted that OSHA officials attempted to "elevate" the
effect of the Florida legislation, mandating two clerks during night shifts, to
"almost mythical proportions." 1'° NACS retorted that, though robberies in
the relevant retail sector had been halved, homicides of those stores'
96. National Association of Convenience Stores, Statement Issued March 4, 1998:
OSHA Workplace Violence Workshop (visited Mar. 23, 2000 <http://www.
cstorecentral.com/register/resource/resource/security2000osha.html> [hereinafter Statement
Issued].
97. Convenience Store Group Worries, supra note 21.
98. See OSHA's Night Retail Violence Advice Coming, Occupational Health & Safety
Letter, Mar. 16, 1998.
99. See Convenience Store Group Worries, supra note 21.
100. See Statement Issued, supra note 96.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See generally Convenience Store Group Worries, supra note 21; Statement Issued,
supra note 96.
105. Statement Issued, supra note 96.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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employees had increased by 50 percent, illustrating that a decrease in
robberies did not correlate to a decrease in fatalities.
10 8
The meeting closed with OSHA's deputy assistant announcing that the
comment period for the revised recommendations would end in only three
days. °9 After several stakeholders voiced dissatisfaction, the deadline was
pushed back another four days, to March 6, 1998.10 The statement issued
by NACS on March 4, 1998, besides deriding the process of the meeting,
which it called "an affront to the concept of governmental due process"'
and "a sham,"'1 2 accused OSHA of issuing its recommendations based on
research lacking in both credibility and relevance."13  NACS especially
attacked OSHA's suggestions regarding multiple clerks during night shifts
and the use of bullet-resistant barriers, claiming that no valid scientific
evidence had been brought forth supporting such suggestions.! 
a
On April 23, NIOSH released its findings, ranking homicide as the
second-leading cause of workplace death and the leading cause for female
workers.'15 The report also noted that deaths from homicide remained
constant since 1980, as compared to almost every other form of workplace
death, which declined during that same time period.
' 16
Apparently, OSHA was not moved by the NACS criticisms. Five
days after the release of the NIOSH rankings, on April 28, Worker
Memorial Day,117 OSHA held a special ceremony with the families of
victims of convenience store murders,1 8 during which it finally issued its
"Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-
Night Retail Establishments."
11 9
The report differed only slightly from the draft guidelines distributed
in April 1996. Certain "cosmetic" changes were made to clarify language
and increase readability.' 20  Most obviously, the title of the report was
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Seeid.
111. Convenience Store Group Worries, supra note 21.
112. Statement Issued, supra note 96.
113. Seeid.
114. See id.
115. See Homicide Now, supra note 2.
116. See id.
117. See Thomas & Burroughs, supra note 21.
118. See Renee Bamack, Security Systems: Benefits Beyond Securing the Store, NAT'L
PETROLEUM NEws, June 1998, at 23.
119. Copies of this report, otherwise known as OSHA publication #3153, are available to
the news media, free of charge, by contacting OSHA's Office of Public Affairs at (202) 219-
8151. All other individuals should contact either OSHA's Publication Office at (202) 219-
4667 or the U.S. Government Printing Office at (202) 512-1800. The report may also be
viewed and printed from the OSHA website at
<http:llwww.osha-slc.govPublications/osha3153.pdf>.
120. See OSHA Recommends Five-Pronged Approach, SEC. MGMT., Aug. 1998, at 92
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changed from "guidelines" to "recommendations."'12 However, only a few
major policy changes occurred in the two-year period between reports, and
the suggestions in the report remained essentially the same.' 22
The final version listed five components of a safe workplace
environment. 23  The first component is management commitment and
employee involvement. According to this recommendation, "[a]l violent
and threatening incidents should be taken seriously and management
should develop a plan for workplace security, working with police and
other public safety agencies to improve physical security."'
124
The second component, worksite analysis, includes "identifying risk
factors common in retail establishments, such as contact with the public,
money exchange and working alone or in small numbers or in high-crime
areas.'2 5 The report recommends that such analysis should also include a
review of prior incidents, a workplace security review, and periodic safety
inspections.1
26
Hazard prevention and control, the third component, includes the
installation of sufficient lighting, video surveillance cameras, drop safes,
and physical barriers. 27 The report suggests that businesses limit those
areas accessible to customers, increase staff levels, especially during night
shifts, establish emergency communications procedures, and put into
practice standard operating procedures to guide both management and
employees in the aftermath of a violent incident.1
21
Fourth, all employees, supervisors, and security personnel should be
trained and educated to increase awareness of potential security risks and to
increase familiarity with the procedures for protecting themselves and co-
workers.
29
The final component involves the conducting of an evaluation by
[hereinafter Five-Pronged].
121. Id.
122. See id. In addition to the altered title, statistics on sexual assaults were updated and
amended, and a provision recommending the use of speed bumps as a deterrence measure
was deleted.
123. See United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-
Night Retail Establishments (visited Mar. 23, 2000)
<http://www.osha-slc.govlPublications/osha3l53.pdf> [hereinafter Recommendations]. For
an overview of the report, see United States Department of Labor, Office of Public Affairs,
OSHA National News Release, USDL 98-179, OSHA Issues Recommendations for
Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-Night Retail Establishments (visited Mar.
23, 2000) <http:llwww.osha.gov:80/media/oshnews/apr98/osha98179.html>.
124. Recommendations, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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employers to create a procedure by which they may assess risk factors,
evaluate hazard control techniques, and identify training needs.'30 The
procedure developed should also include consistent record keeping,
incident reports, police recommendations, and notes of safety meetings.'
On the surface, these recommendations seem sound. They can hardly
be described as groundbreaking in their originality or insight. However,
though everyone involved shares the same priority - saving lives - there
exists bitter disagreement about how exactly to achieve that goal.
III. REACTIONS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The issuance of the recommendations elicited reactions from all
ranges of the spectrum, from industry associations and individual
corporations, to victims' groups and other government agencies.
NACS renewed its vigorous complaints and, in fact, designated its
response to the OSHA report as a top legislative priority. 32 In particular,
NACS directed its critical energy toward the science and the propriety of
the recommendations, especially the two-clerk and bullet-resistant barrier
issues.'3 3 The NACS stance is that no credible evidence exists that proves a
second clerk actually decreases the risk of employee injury. '3 Both sides
in this debate, OSHA and NACS, wield studies by NIOSH and others in
support of their positions.13.
NACS interprets the studies as illustrating that multiple clerks do not
increase safety but may actually increase the risk of injury by leading the
clerks to attempt to overtake a robber.3 6 A well-accepted proposition is
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See NACS Sets Strategy for Year, U.S. DISTRm. J., May 15, 1998, at 14.
133. See Five-Pronged, supra note 120; Bamack, supra note 118.
134. See Five-Pronged, supra note 120; Bamack, supra note 118 (statement of Teri
Richman, NACS senior vice-president for research and industry affairs). For a detailed
discussion of the NACS position, see National Association of Convenience Stores, Talking
Points: Multiple Clerks As a Safety Strategy (visited Mar. 23, 2000)
<http:llcstorecentral.comlregister/resource/resource/clerks. html> [hereinafter Multiple
Clerks]; Official Comments, supra note 73; NACS Statement, supra note 74; OSHA Lacks,
supra note 75.
135. For NACS interpretations of NIOSH and other studies, see ERICKSON, supra note
14; Official Comments, supra note 73; OSHA Lacks, supra note 75. For OSHA
interpretations, see Recommendations, supra note 123.
136. See ERICKSON, supra note 14; Official Comments, supra note 73; Multiple Clerks,
supra note 134; Five-Pronged, supra note 120; OSHA Issues, supra note 6. The studies
reaching this conclusion have been strongly criticized. See Convenience Store Robberies,
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, VA), May 8, 1998, at B10 (calling the studies "spurious");
Glenn Allen Scott, Crime and Late-Night Clerks: OSHA Finally Recommends Life-Saving
Policies, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, VA), May 20, 1998, at B Il (calling the studies
"dubious"). The stance taken by the convenience store industry with regard to the two-clerk
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that resistance offered during a robbery always increases the chance of
violence,137 by more than 80 percent, according to one measurement.
138
OSHA's response to this argument is that the presence of two clerks should
make no difference as long as they are both properly trained not to resist in
the event of a robbery.
139
The studies cited by OSHA in its recommendations conclude that
multiple clerks decrease the risk of robbery, but not necessarily the risk of
injury or death. 140 Not surprisingly, while OSHA focuses on the first half
of that conclusion, NACS persistently highlights the second half. NACS
has not countered the conclusion, reached by other OSHA-cited studies,
that clerks working alone are a factor taken into account by robbers when
choosing a target.
141
Regardless of statistics, NACS asserts that a second clerk is simply a
second potential victim.142 OSHA and most law enforcement officials, on
the other hand, dismiss such arguments as "absurd," contending that they
are contrary to such fundamental law enforcement principles as having
police officers work in pairs.143  NACS summed up the dispute in the
introduction to its report "Convenience Store Security at the Millenium" by
juxtaposing the statements of "almost any clerk you talk to" and "a
homicide detective." According to the former, two clerks "make me feel
safer," and according to the latter, two clerks equal "two dead people.'
44
The other major provision in the OSHA recommendations attacked by
NACS involves the use of bullet-resistant barriers. OSHA suggests that
such barriers, equipped with pass-through windows, can protect employees
from assaults and weapons, especially in those retail establishments with a
history of robbery or locations in high-crime areas. 45 In situations where
multiple staffing is not feasible, OSHA recommends that such "engineering
controls" as bullet-resistant barriers should be given extra consideration.
46
Once again, NACS takes the position that OSHA has no conclusive
proof that its recommended course of action would be effective.' 47
issue has been compared to that taken by the tobacco industry which, for decades, disputed
assertions that cigarette smoking caused health problems. See id.
137. See Five-Pronged, supra note 120; Thomas & Burroughs, supra note 21 (statement
of Lindsay Hutter, NACS spokeswoman); OSHA Issues, supra note 6.
138. See Multiple Clerks, supra note 134.
139. See Five-Pronged, supra note 120 (statement of OSHA spokeswoman Patricia
Biles).
140. See Recommendations, supra note 123.
141. See id.
142. See Bamack, supra note 118.
143. See Vartabedian, supra note 20.
144. ERicKsON, supra note 14.
145. See Recommendations, supra note 123.
146. Id.
147. See ERicKsON, supra note 14; National Association of Convenience Stores, Talking
DEATH OF A SALESMAN
Specifically, NACS maintains that bullet-resistant barriers are not
completely bulletproof and may have "complicating factors" related to their
operation. 48  The barriers may also create "crime displacement" by
safeguarding employees but endangering customers, who risk being taken
hostage by the robber. 49  Finally, the barriers may create a fearful
environment for customers, making them feel as if they were entering "a
war zone." 
150
OSHA emphasizes, however, that controls such as bullet-resistant
barriers, drop safes, video surveillance equipment, and silent alarms are
"not intended to be a 'one-size-fits-all' prescription."' 5' In fact, the report
recommends that employers use whatever combination of these controls
they deem necessary in order to minimize the risks specific to their retail
establishments.1
52
Even with this built-in flexibility, the OSHA report invoked industry
responses from organizations other than NACS. Margaret Chabris, public
relations manager for the Southland Corporation ("Southland"), the parent
company of 7-Eleven and operator of 17,000 convenience stores
worldwide, 15 stated that Southland already employs most of the controls
recommended by OSHA, including drop safes, minimum cash stock,' 54
brighter lighting, and security cameras. 55 However, Chabris took issue
with the multiple-clerk shifts and bullet-resistant barriers recommended in
the OSHA report. 5' According to Chabris, 7-Eleven Food Stores officially
"disagree[s]" with those recommendations, because there "is no research
that shows employing two people at night decreases crime, 1 57 and because
bullet-resistant barriers "send[] a bad message to customers."'
l5 8
The Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation ("UDS"), owner of
1,230 convenience stores in Texas, also implemented most of OSHA's
Poizts: Bullet-Resistant Barriers (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.cstorecentral.com/
register/resource/resource/barriers.html> [hereinafter Barriers]; Five-Pronged, supra note
120.
148. Barriers, supra note 147 (stating that "keeping the transaction window closed and
secured, as well as functionally retaining the clerk behind the shields have not been
universally successful in locations where bullet resistant areas have been established.").
149. Id.
150. Thomas & Burroughs, supra note 21 (statement of Robert Nickerson, Kentucky
Fried Chicken assistant manager). See also Vaughan, supra note 23 (offering 7-Eleven
spokeswoman, Margaret Chabris's opinion on the negative effects of barriers); Barriers,
supra note 147.
151. Recommendations, supra note 123.
152. See id.
153. See Vaughan, supra note 23.
154. See Thomas & Burroughs, supra note 21.
155. See Vaughan, supra note 23.
156. See Thomas & Burroughs, supra note 21.
157. Id.
158. Vaughan, supra note 23.
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recommendations long before the report. However, UDS shares the
opinion of NACS and Southland that employing two clerks at night is not
"statistic[ally] ... advantageous.'
59
David D'Onofrio, of the National Small Business United group
("NSBU"), stated that his organization will continue to lobby OSHA to
relax its "controlling" measures. 16° NSBU is also concerned that the OSHA
report could be used as a "de facto legal standard" to cite employers who
do not comply.161 This concern stems from the General Duty clause of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, which provides that "[e]ach employer
shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.'
62
Though OSHA has prosecuted only a small number of workplace violence
cases based on its General Duty clause, the industry fears that "OSHA will
cite its recommendations as evidence of industry knowledge regarding
what [constitutes] a recognized hazard. "1 63
OSHA anticipated this concern and, in fact, "took pains" to address
the issue squarely in its recommendations. 64 In the "Employers' Duties and
Workplace Violence" section at the front of the report, OSHA emphasized
that:
These recommendations are not a new standard or regulation and
do not create any new OSHA duties. Under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, the extent of an employer's
obligation to address workplace violence is governed by the
General Duty Clause. The fact that a measure is recommended in
this document but not adopted by an employer is not evidence of
a violation of the General Duty Clause.' 65
OSHA spokeswoman Patricia Biles stressed that individual businesses
should feel free to implement only those recommendations that "fit their
own particular needs" and that "failure to implement any of the suggestions
is not a violation of any OSHA regulation."' 6 6 Indeed, Charles Jeffress, the
head of OSHA, declared that the "recommendations are not a new standard
or regulation nor a substitute for any current standards."1 67  Bonnie
Friedman, another spokeswoman for OSHA, noted that the
159. Id. (statement of Anne Cannon, UDS spokeswoman).
160. See Five-Prong, supra note 120.
161. Id.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1999).
163. OSHA Update, MissouRi EMPL. L. LETrER, July 1998.
164. Id.
165. Recommendations, supra note 123, at 2 (emphasis in original).
166. Five-Prong, supra note 120.
167. OSHA Issues Plan for Workplace Violence Prevention, HEALTH LETTER ON THE
CDC, May 11, 1998.
DEATH OF A SALESMAN
recommendations "are not tied to any enforcement mechanism.""16 Before
delving into any of the recommendations, the OSHA report itself attempts
to make clear that "these recommendations are not intended to establish a
legal standard of care... [and] do not impose, and are not intended to
result in, the imposition of any new legal obligations or constraints on
employers ... ,,169
Notwithstanding the assurances made by OSHA spokespeople and in
the report itself, criticism is continuous as to how the recommendations
will be used in practice. Even if OSHA does not use the recommendations
to cite employers who do not follow them, there exists a concern in the
industry that the recommendations will be used by plaintiffs' lawyers in
lawsuits alleging employer negligence. For example, several members of
the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers made known their fear that
"[e]ven though it is just a guideline, somebody is going to pursue a lawsuit
that says the operator knew about this two-clerk thing, it was recommended
by OSHA, they didn't do it, therefore they are liable.
170
NACS also disapproved of the recommendations because of concern
that they would be used by plaintiffs in cases brought against retail stores.
Even when the report was in the "guidelines" phase in 1996, NACS was
apprehensive about the possibility of plaintiffs' lawyers holding up the
OSHA suggestions as "federally approved minimum standards which an
employer is obligated to implement.' 71  The NACS was so concerned
about the impact of the recommendations that in April 1998, when the
report was finally issued, NACS vice-president for government relations
entertained the option of filing a lawsuit against OSHA.
172
The litigation concern on the part of the retail industry is not merely
fanciful. Convenience store corporations have been sued successfully, on
common law duty-to-protect grounds, for not providing employees
adequate safety protections in the face of what was labeled a "reasonably
foreseeable risk" of a criminal attack. 173 Indeed, the family of Ann Marie
Sherman, the murdered Subway worker mentioned at the outset of this
Comment, has sued Subway for inadequately training and protecting its
168. OSHA Issues, supra note 6.
169. Recommendations, supra note 123, at 2.
170. Barnack, supra note 118 (statement of Mike Upp, Westec Interactive Security vice-
president of marketing and business development).
171. OSHA Lacks, supra note 75.
172. See Plan May Protect Clerks, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Apr. 28, 1998, at Al.
173. Morris v. Krauszer's Food Stores, Inc., 693 A.2d 510, 512-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997) (affirming a $1.8 million verdict against convenience store owners for not
fulfilling their duty to protect their employees from the criminal acts of others, where a
mother of nine children was shot to death while working alone in a store that had no alarm
system, no security cameras, poor lighting, poor visibility, and ample, unmonitored escape
routes for potential robbers or assailants).
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employees.'74
At the time this Comment was written, the Sherman case had not yet
been tried, though it is not implausible that the plaintiffs could use the
OSHA recommendations to support their claim. Their attorney might
argue that state courts previously have upheld the use of violations of
OSHA standards as evidence in negligence actions, 175 and therefore the
recommendations should not be excluded as irrelevant or prejudicial. The
opposing argument, of course, would be that recommendations do not have
the same binding or probative value as standards, though it is the retail
industry's fear that this line will be blurred in a courtroom.
The expression of anxiety over the possibility of the recommendations
being used as jury fodder is not limited to private organizations. In fact,
other federal entities have also voiced agreement on the point. The
manager of labor law policy at the United States Chamber of Commerce,
Peter Eide, hypothesized that, in the event of a negligence lawsuit
following an incident of workplace violence, plaintiffs' lawyers would
simply "point to" the OSHA report and "nail the retailer for being derelict
of duty, even if a particular item made no sense for that business.' 76 Eide
criticized OSHA for "going beyond the purview of its stated jurisdiction,"
calling the report a "start down the slippery slope, when OSHA can say that
they have to regulate, even with a guideline, anything that may be harmful
to anyone that happens to be on a payroll when the harm befalls them."'
177
Not all reactions to the report were negative, however. And perhaps it
is no surprise that those people who reacted positively are, debatably, the
same people who are affected most by the recommendations: the
employees and their loved ones. In 1994, Donald Newton's brother,
Robert, was shot in the head while finishing his evening shift at a gas
station/convenience store. After killing Robert, the robber leveled his
gun at his victim's eight-year-old stepdaughter, but the gun jammed.
79
Donald believes the OSHA recommendations are "good ideas," and hopes
they can prevent other families from enduring the tragedy his family has
endured." °
The United Food and Commercial Workers' Union welcomed the
recommendations on behalf of its over 800,000 members, most of whom
174. See Kumar, supra note 1.
175. See, e.g., Kerry M. Parker, Work Violence Considerations for Employers, N.J.
LAw., Apr. 1999, at 18, 21 (citing McComish v. DeSoi, 200 A.2d 116 (N.J. 1964); Smith v.
Kris-Bal Realty, Inc., 576 A.2d 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)).
176. OSHA Issues, supra note 6 (internal quotations omitted).
177. Id.
178. See Thomas & Burroughs, supra note 21.
179. See id.
180. Id.
DEATH OF A SALESMAN
are employed in those establishments addressed by the report.181 Nancy
Carothers, along with her brother Thomas and sister Jean, founded the
Convenience Store Safety Committee ("CSSC"), after their father was
killed for petty cash and a six-pack of beer while working at a 7-Eleven. 2
The CSSC is dedicated to "fighting... against the practice of leaving late-
night workers alone and unprotected in stores that are magnets for
crime. ' The siblings hail the OSHA report as the "first accomplishmentin 20 years" for victims' groups who have "always been squashed by the
industry. '" 84
A factor that undoubtedly plays a role in this dynamic is the reality
that members of such groups are usually low-income workers with little or
no political influence.18 ' The OSHA recommendations provide victims and
their families with a weapon that, though binding in neither a regulatory
nor legal context, may be wielded in front of sympathetic juries during
private lawsuits.8 6 And regardless of OSHA's warranties to the contrary,
some victims' groups contend that if a retail employer "ignores" the
recommendations, and an employee is killed, then a court should hold that
employer accountable. 7
The debate, so framed, calls for an analysis on the logic and the facts
involved.
IV. ANALYSIS
The first step in this analysis is the determination of whether or not
OSHA should be involved at all in workplace violence prevention. Indeed,
OSHA's primary duty - in fact, its reason for existence - is to ensure
workplace safety. However, with workplaces incurring fewer accidents
due to more advanced safety equipment and stricter regulations, violence in
the workplace is looming larger as a cause of employee injury.
Peter Eide, of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, stated that workplace
violence prevention "is a matter for state-based law enforcement, and the
correction institutions, not for federal OSHA."'88 However, Eide is
concentrating on remedial measures here instead of preventive measures.
The power of law enforcement and correctional institutions only enter the
picture after a crime has been committed. OSHA, through its
recommendations, is attempting to outright prevent the occurrence of the
181. See Scott, supra note 136.
182. Seeid.
183. Id.
184. OSHA's Plan, supra note 21.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. OSHA Issues, supra note 6.
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crime.
If Eide is merely opposed to federal involvement, it bears noting that
even employee safety recommendations issued on a state level would be
subject to the same criticisms waged against federal OSHA-issued
recommendations. That is, they are not appropriate as blanket rules and
individual retail establishments should be free to implement measures
catered to their specific needs. Yet such freedom is exactly what the
OSHA recommendations allow. The OSHA report could not be more
explicit as to its own non-binding nature. Furthermore, OSHA
prosecutions for violations of the General Duty Clause are extremely
uncommon.8 9 That fact, combined with the clear language of the OSHA
report removing the recommendations from the realm of mandatory
regulations, renders the possibility of OSHA citing employers for non-
compliance virtually unthinkable at best and drastically unlikely at worst.
Thus, given the rather slim risk of OSHA using, or abusing, its own
recommendations to cite employers, the only concern remaining involves
the use of the recommendations by plaintiffs' lawyers during private
lawsuits brought against employers. These concerns, though legitimate, are
overstated. Testimony or evidence regarding the OSHA report would have
to pass the standard relevance objections as well as routine weighing of its
probative versus its prejudicial value.1 90 As long as a retail establishment
took reasonable measures to safeguard its employees, any credible defense
attorney should be capable of pointing out the irrelevance of those OSHA
recommendations regarding security controls that are impracticable for the
establishment in question.
Indeed, the OSHA report itself supplies paragraphs worth of language
pertaining precisely to the fact that individual retail establishments are not
only free, but are encouraged, to pick and choose amongst the various
available safety measures, according to the particularized needs of that
establishment. In the case, however, where an employer consciously chose
not to address a recognized security hazard and an employee was killed as a
result, then the OSHA recommendations would bear little responsibility for
that employer's liability, compared to that employer's own actions or lack
thereof.
Moreover, even if the recommendations did not exist at all, the studies
and research on which the recommendations are based would still both
exist and be accessible to any plaintiffs lawyer who deems such a
presentation at trial to be a worthwhile strategy. Finally, even in the
scenario in which a jury hears evidence of non-binding recommendations
that were not followed to the letter, the chance of nullification - of the
189. See id.
190. See FED. R. EvID. 401,403.
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jury returning a verdict contrary to the rule of law or the weight of the
evidence - is small, to say the least. If defense counsel believes that such
a verdict may be returned, they are permitted to file a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law as well as a renewed motion after an
unfavorable verdict, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or the state or local equivalent.
Those individual provisions of the report most commonly criticized
are, not surprisingly, bullet-resistant barriers and multi-clerk shifts. Some
of the arguments against the use of the barriers are particularly weak. For
instance, it is simply irrelevant that bullet-resistant barriers are not totally
bulletproof. Kevlar vests worn by police officers are not totally
bulletproof, yet they are worn because they at least reduce the chance of
death or serious bodily injury. In the retail establishment context, video
surveillance cameras are effective even though they do not, indeed cannot,
survey everything, all of the time. The fact that bullet-resistant barriers are
susceptible to steel-jacketed bullets and the so-called "cop killer" bullets91'
does not vitiate the fact that the barriers, true to their name, resist the great
majority of bullet types. And, quite fundamentally, some protection is
better than no protection.
This last point also pertains to the "complicating factors" in the
operation of the barriers. NACS emphasizes that "keeping the transaction
window closed and secured, as well as functionally retaining the clerk
behind the shields have not been universally successful . .. ,192 If this is
true, the statement indicates that in some, or most, instances, these factors
have not been complicating. The fact that some employees have had
difficulties operating the barriers should not preclude other employees from
being protected. Better training and better barriers may help this situation.
Crime displacement - the protecting of employees but the
endangering of customers - is a legitimate concern, but it should not be a
reason to refrain from installing a barrier where one is needed. Neither
OSHA nor NACS quotes statistics referring to the chance of robbers taking
customers hostage. An argument is therefore difficult to base scientifically.
Logically, however, a robber may take a hostage in an establishment
without a barrier just as easily as in a barrier-equipped establishment. The
motivation for taking the hostage in each instance is the same: to force the
clerk, under threat of harm to someone else, to comply with the robber's
demands. The only difference between the scenarios is that the employees
are protected in the latter scenario. In both scenarios, the customers are
not. Once again, the remedy, though not a total cure, is still more effective
than no remedy at all.
191. See Barriers, supra note 147.
192. Id.
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As for aesthetics, the only instance in which this consideration would
become important is where an employer determines that a barrier would be
useful at a particular establishment. At that point, an employer's
affirmative decision not to install a barrier, solely because of aesthetics,
even though the establishment was deemed in need of such a barrier, would
be outright unconscionable. The preventable risk of death or injury should
not "be accepted as a cost of doing business in our society. '' 193
The multiple-clerk debate is perhaps the most divisive single issue in
the entire retail violence saga. Indeed, NACS commissioned its exhaustive
"Convenience Store Security at the Millenium" report mainly to address
this issue. Their most persuasive argument, however, though based in
science, is flawed in logic. As mentioned previously, NACS continually
points to the research showing no correlation between the use of a second
clerk and a decrease in employee injury. Thus, NACS claims that no
credible evidence exists to support the OSHA recommendation of multi-
clerk shifts.
OSHA itself admits in its report that "no study has found that use of
more than one clerk increases or decreases the risk of injury."194 OSHA
does, however, cite a study reporting that the risk of employee injury is
nearly equal in single- and multi-clerk establishments, assuming the
occurrence of a robbery. 95 OSHA also cites several studies finding a
statistically significant association between multiple clerks and a reduced
risk of robbery. 96  Thus, by employing multiple clerks, and thereby
reducing the chance that a robbery will take place, an employer is also
reducing the chance that employees will be placed in a situation in which
injuries may occur.
Arguendo, even if employing multiple clerks only reduces the risk of
robbery, without affecting the risk of injury at all, that practice should still
be in the best interests of the employer. No sensible employer would want
to expose his or her employees to a number of dangerous situations greater
than the number that is absolutely unavoidable. That is, if employers know
some method by which to reduce the risk of robberies, most of which
involve guns aimed at their employees, there seems no legitimate reason
not to employ that method.
The principal response from NACS has been that multiple clerks may
be encouraged to overtake the robber, which almost universally results in
employee injury. This argument, though, falls flat. An integral component
193. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, Current Intelligence Bulletin 57, Violence in the Workplace:
Introduction (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violintr.html>.
194. Recommendations, supra note 123, at n.6.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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of training clerks in the event of a robbery is the notion of no resistance.
This rule should apply to all clerks, whether working alone or in a group.
To postulate that two clerks would resist a robber is to postulate that the
clerks would disregard their training. Such an argument proves too much.
Deviating from the expected or required practice would render any security
measure ineffectual. For instance, no matter how advanced or reliable a
security surveillance system may be, if a clerk decides not to insert the tape
and push "record," the system will not be effective. Thus, employers
relying on the argument that employees would disregard their training, in
effect, is equivalent to employers admitting either that they hire deficient
people or that they train them inadequately.
The last line of defense might be that "if double coverage [two clerks]
were the panacea that everyone wants to claim it is, the industry would
have done it a long time ago."' 97 This rationale, again, does not hold.
There are countless examples, some very recent, of companies and
industries not implementing some measure known to be effective in
protecting health or valuables due to various reasons. One important
reason is money. It might be surprising that this Comment is coming to a
close and only now is expense cited as a possible motivation to act or, in
this case, not to act. Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, of all the
industry responses addressed in this Comment, not one even mentioned the
issue, save for an indirect link made in a statement that critics of the OSHA
recommendations believed "that implementation.., could lead to
increased prices as store owners pass on their costs to consumers."' 98 This
one sentence is the only mention made, out of every source cited in this
Comment, of cost to the employer in implementing these security
measures.
I submit that NACS and other industry members are taking into
account the issue of cost quite heavily, even though they do not use the
issue as an argument in favor of their policies or non-policies, for
predictable, though possibly not justifiable, reasons. Security systems and
features are expensive, as are multi-clerk shifts. At the least, these shifts
are more costly to the employer than single-clerk shifts. In pondering the
arguments and research on both sides, one cannot help but think that multi-
clerk night shifts simply make sense, that bullet-resistant barriers, if
needed, should be installed, and that employees generally should not be
subjected to preventable risk. The NACS research can be convincing, but
seems counterintuitive. The organization's arguments, especially on the
two-clerk issue, when expounded upon, do not compensate for the plain,
gut feeling that "safety in numbers" is a common phrase for a valid reason.
197. Barnack, supra note 118 (quoting statement of Rollie Trayte, director of corporate
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V. CONCLUSION
The story of the tortuous path from draft guidelines to published
recommendations illustrates the variety of views involved with the problem
of workplace violence. Everyone agrees on what to do, but not on how to
do it. I believe that the OSHA recommendations are appropriate and
useful. Employers, though not bound by them, should heed them, or at
least read them. Their employees, and their employees' loved ones, deserve
that much.
